

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

EVOLVING REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ANDEAN REGION

by

Lieutenant Colonel Luis Antonio Auz Beltrán
Ecuadorian Army

Colonel Joseph R. Nuñez
Project Advisor

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Report Documentation Page			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188		
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 03 MAY 2004		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Evolving Regional Security in the Andean Region				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Luis Auz				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached file.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 27	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: LTC. Luis Auz

TITLE: Evolving Regional Security Arrangements in the Andean Region

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 19 March 2004 PAGES: 27 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Andean States have maintained a constant struggle against international threats, yet without proper world community recognition. Counter narcotrafficking constitutes a high value Andean States' policy, neither to coincide with United States' foreign policy nor to look for international economical assistance. However, there are few regional efforts to fight against these international threats. Different perceptions and radical positions of national sovereignty and non-intervention in state foreign policies do not consider the increasing risk of a "balloon effect" that can affect each state in the Andean region. This paper will analyze the possibility of adapting sovereignty concepts to a higher level of nation-state in order to establish a "regional state" that will provide more capacities to achieve a future of security and development.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
EVOLVING REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ANDEAN REGION	1
INTRODUCTION.....	1
SECURITY DEVELOPMENT	2
SOVEREIGNTY AND REGIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS.....	4
GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY	6
ECONOMIC AND SOVEREIGNTY.....	8
HEMISPHERIC INCONGRUENCE IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION.....	10
SOVEREIGNTY VS. NECESSITY.....	11
CONCLUSIONS	12
ENDNOTES	15
BIBLIOGRAPHY	19

EVOLVING REGIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ANDEAN REGION

INTRODUCTION

The Andean Ridge, a naturally privileged region with enough capacity to forge a promising future, is made up of weak states mainly focused on reviving economic growth, dealing with rising social pressures and tensions, and resolving political conflicts. Political instability has expanded throughout Latin America, but the Andean region is the one that is ailing most - its five countries (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia) face very serious problems. Andean countries are heading towards a redefinition of their societies, and what is vibrating beneath genuine concern for democracy is the issue of poverty. The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) said in a report on the region's 211 million poor, that poverty in the five Andean nations is higher than the Latin American average of 43.8 percent.¹

The Andean States are in crisis or near crisis, with no clear relief in sight anywhere,² and poverty a common cause of social unrest. Surely what is occurring in Bolivia is an extreme example of a social gap so wide that it makes coexistence difficult. Narcotrafficking and terrorism activities immersed Colombia in a permanent fight that continues after 30 years. It increases the risk to stability in the region. Colombia, the center of the illicit narcotics industry,³ achieved some success in its fight since United States assistance was increased. Nevertheless, defeating narcotrafficking is a long way away because its power increased through alliances with terrorist groups. Crime provides the poor a source of income, and it is a heavy economic temptation that weakens societal values. The Andean Ridge bets its future on international support, the only way of accomplishing an ambitious but difficult goal.

Andean States have maintained a constant struggle against international threats, yet without proper world community recognition. Counter narcotrafficking constitutes a high value Andean States' policy, neither to coincide with United States' foreign policy nor to look for international economical assistance. It represents the interpretation of international principles to preserve human life regardless of drug consumers' origins. However, states limited capabilities to prevail in a non-traditional war against well organized, economically powerful, and illegal organizations imply a more open involvement of the international community.

Andean States are considered in the United States Andean Regional Initiative, since 2002,⁴ and also allocate their own resources, even sacrificing those needed to solve other crucial internal problems. But it is premature to predict a solution in the short, middle or long term because the regional modus operandi of the illicit drug enterprise goes beyond states borders.⁵ Thus, an extremely strong global support structure and the close relationship with

terrorism supercede local government's capacities in the Andean Ridge and undercuts international pressure to have a regional commitment. The states limited capabilities to win an unconventional war without a regional approach make matters even more difficult.

Regional efforts to eradicate this evil enterprise and its related activities and effects are performed through separate efforts according to the states' particular perception of the threat. The struggle is performed without attempting to bypass states' sovereignty, which is considered the strongest principle that rules their existence in the region.

Andean States indirect objection for open collaboration in a regional fight is due to the perception of being constrained by a hegemonic power. The United States policy to solve problems in the Americas by military interventions was strongly perceived as indicators of disrespect for the principles of sovereignty and remains a major concern. It demonstrated regularly that a powerful state could impose its interests wherever considered necessary. Thus, a counterproductive perception of imperial temptations developed. This negatively affects the process of creating a hemispheric community based upon cooperation and developing regional commitments.

From a globalized point of view "it does not make sense to separate 'regional' from 'global' developments, let alone to oppose the two as alternative models of world institutional development. Regionalist interpretations often seem to rely implicitly on a kind of geographical essentialism which sees continents as natural bases for political-economic associations of states."⁶ The initiative to establish western-hemispheric regional integration by having a continental free market area is considered a step toward globalization. It also helps the region to achieve more stability and control.

SECURITY DEVELOPMENT

Historically, the system of security interests in Latin Americas coincided with the process of nation-state formation. In regard to security, this process was related to the process of development, reinforced by national ideologies.⁷ A permanent relation between security interests and nation-state formation perseveres with strong influence in the Andean States. Defense policies based on a permanent threat of losing sovereignty or territory by secession or through military defeat were primarily defined two centuries ago and remain almost the same nowadays. Sovereignty, identified as a principal national security interest, was allocated within constitutions and validates economic autarky and nationalism to justify defense policies and heavy military budgets.

Economic and some coercive controls exerted by United States instead of establishing a better understanding among Andean States have created a disparity in military powers and provided another reason to reinforce sovereignty concepts and nationalism. The examples of military operations performed in Grenada, Nicaragua, and Panama that superseded states' sovereignty are seen as a confirmation of unilateral exercise of military force to resolve policy problems in order to protect U. S. national interests in the Western Hemisphere or Americas. The Andean States reject the new international security strategy, and took it as a reference point to introduce deterrence doctrine in their defense policy.

The security agenda brought new commitments and involved regional cooperation. Traditional border antagonisms became secondary. The emphasis on solving a wide spectrum of problems brought positive results like the Andean Regional Initiative, which set out three overarching goals: democracy, development and drugs.⁸ Its genesis is Colombia's internal conflict. However, the initiative emerged without a regional consensus and was misunderstood by leaders and societies as a requirement to endorse a conflict where the participants have more to lose than to gain. An unintended consequence was the rebirth of sovereignty to avoid commitments.

The new concept of preventive war introduced after 9-11 set the course for U.S. foreign policy to quickly annihilate terrorism.⁹ States around the world were under new pressures to support this doctrine. The Andean Ridge is threatened by narco-terrorism in Colombia that is spilling over its borders. Thus, it should be included in the use of all resources, as well as those bordering countries in the region. Where appropriate, the use of military force should be employed if it is necessary to put an end to these activities.¹⁰ The demand for a new regional security concept must be outlined not only to assure temporary stability by helping to solve Colombia's conflict, but also to avoid the balloon effect in the region.¹¹ Past experiences in Bolivia and Peru are clear examples of successful states' narcotrafficking and terrorism struggles with limited effects in regional security because they entailed a problem transferred within the region instead eradication.

The Andean States, immersed in internal problems which afflict their societies, must question their national security interests and sovereignty concepts because they impede regional integration. It does not require an increased expenditure of resources, nor does it challenge state existence. New concepts of regional integration go beyond economic issues to develop unique commitments, avoid particular strategies, and provide enough power to confront regional threats. There is no possibility of succeeding against regional threats if the will of the states is to avoid participation as much as possible without considering the risks.

Many of the new threats, concerns, and other challenges to regional security are transnational in nature and may require appropriate hemispheric cooperation.¹² It demands a new concept of regional integration, not only to ratify the core essence of multiple international organizations like United Nations and Organization of American States, but also to allocate resources to counter regional threats as a unified “regional state.” The term “regional state” is used to focus on the importance of having a unique collectivity to develop and implement regional security policies as a core of a complete integration. It also amalgamates state power to position the Andean States more promptly in the Western Hemisphere.

SOVEREIGNTY AND REGIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

“Nation-states creation involved five developments: national consolidation of power, creation of a national sense of loyalty, erosion of natural law to which national rulers were accountable, creation of a system of national laws, and the creation of the concept of national sovereign equality of all nation-states. The five developments ran together and reinforced one another.”¹³

The Andean States values of sovereignty, nonintervention, and national self-determination define a resistance to multilateral or collective approaches to problems affecting the region. It is interpreted as a utilization of international forums to achieve national ends, and stay away from regional commitments. New concepts of international cooperation require partial renunciation of the principles of non-intervention, national self-determination, and sovereignty.¹⁴ Sovereignty becomes a refuge for states unwilling to uphold international obligations.¹⁵

Sovereignty concepts evolve, and their application in a globalized world is becoming less and less absolute. Sovereignty is frequently violated by criminal non-state actors, who take advantage of ungoverned space, weak to non-existent border controls, and the facility offered by bilateral agreements.¹⁶

Venezuela’s decision to restrict flying to control narcotrafficking activities is considered a violation of minimum standards by committing, permitting, or threatening intolerable acts against humanity. Given this, some of its privileges of sovereignty could be forfeited.¹⁷ However, it also defines the strength of sovereignty as perhaps the only way to value the existence of a weak state in a globalized world. Therefore Venezuela’s defense of sovereignty is shared, as a concept, in the Andean Ridge.

Sovereignty represents an enduring issue emphasized before, during and after signing any agreement. It is also declared a high priority to preserve state survival. Sovereignty is central for Andean States since it defines its foreign policy.

Sovereignty is a source of stability. It fosters world order by establishing legal protections against external intervention and by offering a diplomatic foundation for the negotiation of international treaties, the formation of international organizations, and the development of international law. It also provides a stable framework for representative government and market economies. At the beginning of the 21st Century, sovereignty remains an essential foundation for peace, democracy, and prosperity. At the same time, sovereignty is challenged from both within and without. Weak states struggle to exercise legitimate authority within their territories. Globalization makes it harder for all nations to control their frontiers. Governments trade freedom of action for benefits of multilateral cooperation and outlaw regimes jeopardize their sovereign status by pursuing reckless policies fraught with danger for their citizens and the international community.¹⁸ It entails considerable changes in the conception of national interest in weak states in order to attain regional interests and achieve more deference globally. Actually, cooperation among Andean States can strengthen sovereignty because many states cannot control their borders and large portions of terrain.

Andean Ridge regional interests are not clearly defined and tend to be totally rhetorical. Regional leaders have resisted the necessary recognition of encouraging integration based in economic framework and regional security. An initial step would be to forgo state sovereignty and adopt a "regional sovereignty" to strengthen the Andean Region and avoid membership in the failed states group. Integration does not mean a renunciation of state existence, rather it entails an opportunity to forge a better future in a globalized world order.

The Andean region concentration of the four trafficking phenomena: narcotrafficking, arms traffic, capital laundry, and guerrillas exist in a parallel economy and amid the weakness of democratic institutions, which is most visible in the erosion of political parties, even though the 'democratic reserves' in the population are strong.¹⁹ Reciprocal effects of security between neighboring countries, transnational actors and threats like organized crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, and arms trafficking were recognized in the recent Mexico Conference in OAS as threats to the hemispheric security that demand cooperation to avoid deepening the weaknesses of security systems by traditional security isolationism in strategy conception.²⁰

Andean States must recognize their weak capacity to achieve total sovereignty. They must overcome internal opposition by gradually changing concepts that will transform states so they can establish a new global world configuration through more international cooperation. Nevertheless, strong internal political opposition poses a real challenge for each Andean State to one degree or another. Colombia, a more mature democracy, opened up to accept regional

commitments but other Andean States are unwilling to give up traditional state sovereignty concepts.

The experience during the 1990's in managing conflict in Somalia and Afghanistan is the point of reference in preventing today's troubled countries from becoming failed states tomorrow.²¹ It had a deep foreign policy influence on how to deal with weak and failing states.

Andean States today are immersed in permanent unconventional phenomena, where internal subversion, transnational illegal activities, institutionalized corruption and socioeconomic disturbances thwart state sovereignty, destabilize the region, and increase the risk of spill-over beyond the Andean Ridge. The problem is exacerbated by the limited security cooperation among Andean States. For instance, Bolivia is immersed in solving internal conflicts and differences with Chile. Colombia, the core of the biggest threats in the Andean Region, is succeeding in the implementation of "Plan Colombia," however, the message of its foreign policy is to have enough capacity to only deal with problems that undermine its society. Ecuador is in a process of recovering from a huge economic recession and is avoiding direct participation in solving regional threats. Venezuela, now politically unstable, has taken a difficult position in confronting the United States, a principal partner in assisting Andean States. This approach drives its foreign policy far away from regional security priorities. It represents a big concern when security issues are on the negotiation table. This kind of policy among neighbor states could become antagonistic in the short term. It weakens security systems, increases tensions, and disrupts integration efforts. States could sink into volatile and dangerous international relationships, such as is the case with Venezuela. Paradoxically, security challenges require preventive measures based on mutual trust to minimize tense situations and avoid misinformation that threatens national and regional stability.²² In some cases, suspicion or insecurity is not aroused by the intentions of an opposing state army, but results from the possibility that political instability will weaken state ability to guarantee domestic sovereignty.²³

GLOBALIZATION AND SOVEREIGNTY

As a major consequence of modernity, globalization has major effects on the understanding the state. It is defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away (and vice versa) that undermines the nation-state.²⁴

It is a reality that globalization transcends borders. Thus, the national-international division is no longer the fundamental structure. Instead of anarchy, there is the structure of a unitary world, in which all divisions, whether political or cultural, are relative matters. To those

who do not perceive the transformation as a whole, the process of unification appears instead, in all its potential disturbances, as one of postmodern fragmentation.²⁵

Globalization grows as inseparable constituent of world international development. It endorses paradigm change, like the altering of the nation-state sovereignty concept through territorial delimiting. Measurement parameters applied are practically absurd since territorial frontiers in many cases are symbolic representations of states' sovereignty. Social interaction through different aspects demonstrates a growing integration beyond state regulations or planning, and surpasses all relative paradigms of territorial limits established between nations. It implies state necessity of working jointly for the benefit of regional and world integration. It should begin by sharing values instead of imposing them by restrictive concepts of power and control. The principles of nation-state and sovereignty are transformed by global state developments. The emergence of the global state does not abolish the nation-state, but transforms its role. Sovereignty has been reduced, increasingly, to a juridical form with which states negotiate with each other and with other institutions, such as corporations, in a global-cum-national order.

Globalization's new pattern draws on inevitable integration requirements to gain access to more sophisticated markets, avoid exclusions and divisions, take advantage of information opportunities, and be aware of the rights concerning global public property, such as air, water, the oceans and space.²⁶ Nowadays, globalization presents scenarios and challenges which are radically different from those a decade or more ago, before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the socialist system. The European Union integration process is a clear example of the acceptance of multiple measures by individual states. It abdicates some state control to a greater hierarchy and organization. This system developed a new concept of sovereignty that is used as a pillar of a new structure of regional identity. The European Union upholds integration of states to strengthen the sovereignty of a region, in a higher level conception of nation-states. The "European Regional Integration" prevails over paradigms of individual states and makes them more economically competitive.

Throughout the Andean region, the governments of Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia find themselves confronted by a series of security challenges that reflect the influence of globalization upon traditional dimensions of conflict in the region. "Analysts have suggested that effective state sovereignty is being whittled away under pressure from the forces of regionalization and globalization."²⁷

Andean States find themselves confronted by a series of security challenges that reflect the influence of globalization upon traditional dimensions of conflict in the region. Globalization

has not only redefined security issues in a generic sense,²⁸ but now complicates and dramatically increases the difficulty that states face in shaping responses through traditional national means.²⁹ Andean States are increasingly overwhelmed by external forces that converge with domestic problems to create nearly insurmountable obstacles to crisis management and development.

Andean States are far from visualizing a total integration, following United States and European Union examples, and seek a limited economic approximation. It does not represent a real integration due to its conceptualization about the competence of states. Andean foreign policies reflect defensive attitudes instead of generating mutual confidence, an essential requirement of true regional integration. Andean States are weakly integrated and lack cohesion even at national level. Governments, leaders, and society are involved in a naive political system without the maturity to drive states toward progress and development. The core of regional integration emanates from states and their societies more than from international influence. Actually, the desired way is in an open and strong democracy with new political actors. The dynamics of change in a globalized world requires new concepts and conceptions. Integration, not isolation, reduces traditional barriers and generates a better environment to deal with challenges beyond economic issues. It can also build solid bases to participate in hemispheric integration. Remaining in current patterns will plunge Andean States into the ranks of failed states indeed.

Changing attitudes toward a regional and international integration means subordinating state sovereignty concepts in favor of a new regional sovereignty conception that leads to an international structure called a "Regional State."

ECONOMIC AND SOVEREIGNTY

Bilateral and multilateral economic agreements represent fundamental steps in regional integration that minimize globalization's negative effects. They represent initial steps toward regional integration, identity, and regional sovereignty.

Improving economic development should be a primary requirement to advance the achievement of integration goals. Andean regional integration represents a difficult challenge to achieve without international support. Unequal economic development impedes the initial steps of Andean Community creation. It has added barriers that protect inefficient local producers, despite the fact that it gives consumers more options to choose and produces enough quality products to cover regional demands.

Economic growth percentages (figure 1) give an idea about regional instability. However, other factors like extreme poverty levels constitute a valuable reference for economic development estimation in the future because they are based on the last decade of performance data. Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru present the worst panorama in the region due to the impossibility of reversing a pattern of increasing levels of extreme poverty. Venezuela is in a less unfortunate position due to oil reserves but is politically and socially unstable. Colombia, the only Andean State with a possibility of dealing with the poverty problem successfully in less than 10 years, continues to fight against narcotrafficking and terrorism.³⁰ Instability increases regional risks, reduces foreign investment, and obscures the panorama of regional integration. It just places the Andean Ridge in a worse situation for the integration process.

Country	GDP* %			
	1999	2000	2001	2002
Bolivia	0.3	2.3	1.6	2.7
Colombia	-3.8	2.5	1.5	1.5
Ecuador	-5.7	0.9	5.5	3.8
Peru	0.9	2.5	-0.1	5.3
Venezuela	-5.5	3.8	3.5	-9.0

FIGURE 1

*This entry gives GDP growth on an annual basis adjusted for inflation and expressed as a percent.

Therefore, countries with few probabilities of emerging economically represent a big challenge to the emerging decision-making to reduce expenditures and to promote economic development. Rapid integration would mean a paradigm change. It will allow a transition from a national identity to a regional identity and the opportunity to create a sovereignty pattern at the same level.

Economic policies driven by organizations such as International Monetary Fund and World Bank constitute real pressures and regulations to be observed, if the states want to have access to cash remittances to sustain their government programs. Not adopting them implies economically worse consequences. This external pressure surpasses the decision-making capacity of states and clearly affects sovereignty. Weak states strongly depend on financial organizations' assistance to survive.

This modus operandi is adopted implicitly in relationship to states' power and economic management capacity. Weak states such as those from the Andean Region must reconsider sovereignty as the only option to receive economic international assistance critical to state stability. States must follow financial market rules in a globalized world. This affects state capacity to settle needs in the hands of international financial organizations that are controlled

tacitly by the most economic powerful countries in the world. The result is that weak states cede some of their sovereignty by following rules imposed by international financial organizations, but gain important benefits that strengthen the legitimacy of the state.

HEMISPHERIC INCONGRUENCE IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION

The Western Hemispheric scenario has the United States in a clear position of leadership. Its foreign policy is focused to create hemispheric consensus in favor of democracy, rule of law, human rights, open markets and social progress by an approved action plan to promote economic prosperity, protect human rights, and fight drug trafficking and organized crime.³¹ The efforts to stabilize the hemisphere have developed different approaches depending on regional, sub-regional, or particular state factors. For instance, since all cocaine originates in the Andean countries of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, the United States devotes a significant portion of their resources to eliminating coca cultivation, disrupting cocaine production, and preventing it from reaching its shores.³² It demonstrates a continuing interdependence and mutual constitutiveness among western states.

An approach towards the Andean States, centered on improving security and development, would encourage increased positive effects in other areas. The Andean States are generally weakly governed. Their past foreign relationships tend to hinder efforts to implement regional security policies that could foster confidence and cooperation between states. For example, the poor exchange of information between national security forces or judicial systems reduces the effectiveness of regional cooperation. Past efforts to achieve consensus among the Andean states have often been frustrated because of differences of national interest. This strains issues of national sovereignty and compromises chances for the success of regional integration. Forms and institutions of state power are complex and often poorly articulated. This is true between countries or even within the same state. They are often embedded in global social relations in many ways.³³ The political events in Bolivia and Colombia, and the stirring tensions in Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela signal fundamental problems in the Andean Community. They have yet to become a foreign policy priority for the United States.³⁴ The main international concern in the region is focused on drug trafficking and guerrilla groups in Colombia.

The Andean States alternative is to tackle problems in a coordinated way to be able to go before the United States to offer new strategies. Unfortunately, in this area they are not making any progress. The bilateral approximation to the United States sets the states' agenda and delays agreement as a region under more reasonable and equitable terms. For instance "Plan

Colombia” was initially developed between United States and Colombia without considering neighboring states directly affected, but that has changed over time.

SOVEREIGNTY VS. NECESSITY

Plan Colombia approval in 1999 defined initial positions of Colombia and the United States in the struggle against drugs, while subsequent reforms permitted a change in policies to combat both drug trafficking and terrorism on Colombian soil. It not only confirms a rapprochement between states actors involved in facing transnational threats, but also an evolution in sovereignty concepts that would increase regional integration to face international threats. For instance, some operations are being performed by foreign elements without Andean Armed Forces, such as surveillance flights by United States Air Force assets using Manta Air Force Base in Ecuador³⁵, and fumigation flights in Colombia by United States contractors.³⁶

The aforementioned facts present two different impacts in these states. Some political and social actors consider that a foreign military presence violates Ecuador’s sovereignty and it can increase risks of being involved in a Colombian conflict, with more to lose than to gain.³⁷ This great opposition changed the government’s attitude toward subsequent commitments related to foreign military presence in the country. On the Colombian side, the panorama is different because of the approval and total support from different Colombian society sectors. They support all kind of initiatives to carry out peace and tranquility. The purpose of solving the four decade old conflict is more powerful than any concept of sovereignty.

Recalling the Clausewitz adage that “One country may support another’s cause, but will never take so seriously as it takes its own,”³⁸ could describe the different positions adopted by each Andean state that hinder an open and integral participation in fighting the common threats of narcotrafficking and terrorism. Particular national interests and restrictive state policies are a rebirth of nationalism and sovereignty that are obstacles to integration. The lack of an institution or leader to enforce and support the process of regional integration (toward a regional state) is a priority that needs to be considered. It would characterize an integration supported by institutions with enough authority to rule. It would give also the regional state an understanding of “regional sovereignty” and a reinforcement of its regional identity. Moreover, integration provides a higher degree of international recognition, and better options to solve regional problems.

CONCLUSIONS

Today's world is full of arrangements and accommodations that make it clear that nation-states do not, need not, and should not cling to 19th Century conceptions of sovereignty. International human rights norms, humanitarian interventions, and the evolution of the European Union all show that sovereignty is a relative, not an absolute, concept. It is layered, shared, and complicated. However, the international regime of nation-states is not about to collapse. National sovereignty may be somewhat less secure these days, but it is still the strongest game in town. It is important that it be so. The state remains the main mechanism for social transfers. It is also the best unit from the point of view of democratic politics, for which supranational, transnational, and global authorities provide little or no real space.³⁹

Disparity of national development, social problems and internal political instability frustrate integration and provide various reasons to avoid regional commitments. Additional economic concepts developed by international financial organizations seek an improvement of weak economies through the reduction of public spending.

From Peru to Venezuela, there are increasing indications that Andean States lack the capacity to surmount their difficulties by traditional means.⁴⁰ There is an interest in having regional integration, but States remain divided on strategy and tactics, and have not been able to create a unified leadership or develop a cohesive agenda for action.

Andean integration beyond economic issues can help states to successfully face great challenges. Having an enriched integration process through an agenda of multiple dimensions will help to focus all efforts on a new strategic design toward a kind of "regional state." The Andean States regional integration needs a supranational authority to avoid placing national considerations above regional considerations. The implementation of regional policies can generate the potential needed to realize regional benefits. To implement this new strategic design, it is necessary to reinforce Andean political cooperation in favor of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and governability.

Individual state strategies to defeat illegal enterprises lack the capacity for success. Additional internal problems involve the Andean States in a more complex scenario. The Andean Ridge is the most unstable sub-region in South America and there is no clear solution in the near future. Much of this instability is due to threats associated with terrorism and drugs.

The development of a variety of strategies, without a well developed foreign policy, represents an obstacle in regional integration efforts. Sometimes, internal factors imply a double discourse; one to try to satisfy the international environment and another to look for an

internal support in order to maintain the government stability. This lack of capacity generates a permanent empty space between intentions and efforts.

Foreign policy toward Andean Region does not exist as a whole. It is marked by bilateral agreements with huge differences based in the conception of risk to their national interest. This kind of approximation thwarts any attempt to create a strong regional integration to confront regional commitments.

Disparity in national development, internal problems, and political instability provide reasons to avoid some commitments. Besides, some economic concepts developed by international financial institutions and organizations to improve these weak economies imply the reduction of public spending. Consequently, it provides to some society sectors a strong justification to ask for a reduction in the amount of resources transferred to the Armed Forces and Police despite security necessities. For instance, the struggle against the toughest problems in these countries, proliferation of terrorism, narco-terrorism and drug trafficking, are not considered from an Andean Region dimension. This focus is on the transfer of some resources towards the protection of national borders and a limited attention to humanitarian causes. Colombia's conflict is misperceived in neighboring countries, since it involves the possibility of direct participation in the conflict that increases military public spending beyond their economic capacities. States also avoid assistance through national sovereignty and non-intervention concepts, and this limits the possibility of having regional security and stability.

It is important to understand the role of the old national-international structure in the emerging global context and also how classic norms of sovereignty and non-intervention, while retaining some currency, are fundamentally breached by common policy-making and interventions by global and regional institutions⁴¹ to overcome nationalism. Therefore, it is a necessity to deeply reform states' policies toward formalizing regional efforts for establishing a "region state" with "regional sovereignty" to have a better capacity to face up to regional threats, improve development, and strengthen democracy.

To go beyond old conceptions is a difficult task; however, there are more similarities than differences among the Andean States and their societies. They provide a starting point to construct a positive future for the region. It is clear that Andean States cannot succeed in a globalized arena without being integrated.

WORD COUNT= 5,218

ENDNOTES

¹ Economic Commission of Latin America and Caribbean (ECLAC). *Economic Indicators of Latin America and the Caribbean 2003: Division. Table D.1: Latin America (17 countries): Poverty and indigence levels, 1990-2000*. The data to 1999 shows Bolivia 60.6%, Colombia 54.9%, Ecuador 63.6% (urban area only there is not data of rural areas), Perú 48.6%, and Venezuela 49.4. It gives an average of 55.42% that is bigger than 43.8 Latin American average.

² Peter Hakim, "U.S.-Latin America relations post-9/11" in *Great Decisions 2004* (Editors of the Foreign Policy Association, 2004), 84.

³ Paul E. Simmons, U.S. "Narcotics Control Initiatives in Colombia, Testimony Presented Before the Senate Drug Caucus," 3 June 2003; available from <<http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/rm/21203.htm>>; Internet; accessed 28 November 2003.

⁴ The White House, "Andean Regional Initiative," Under President Bush's leadership, \$782 million in assistance has been approved for the Andean region in fiscal year 2002. The Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) advances the President's goal of strengthening democracy, regional stability, and economic development throughout the hemisphere. Washington, DC. 23 March 2002; available from <<http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/8980.htm>>; Internet; accessed 21 November 2003.

⁵ Joseph R. Nuñez, "Luchando en Contra de la Trinidad Hobbesiana en Colombia: Una Estrategia Para la Paz" *Aerospace Power Journal*. Tercer Trimestre 2001.

⁶ Sarah Owen-Vandersluis, "The State and Identity Construction in International Relations," in *The State of International Relations*, ed. Martin Shaw. (London, Macmillan 2000), 18; available from <<http://www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/ir/>>; Internet; accessed 12 December 2003.

⁷ Augusto Varas, "Post Cold War Security Interests and Perceptions of Threat in the Western Hemisphere." in *Security, Democracy, and Development in U.S.-Latin American Relations*, ed. Lars Schoultz, William C. Smith, and Augusto Varas (North-South Center 1994), 1.

⁸ K. Larry Storrs and Nina M. Serafino, "Andean regional Initiative (ARI) FY2002 Supplemental and FY2003 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors" in *Colombia Current Issues and Historical Background* ed. Nina M. Serafino (Nova Science Publishers, Inc. 2003), 99.

⁹ U.S. *National Security Strategy*, Art. III, 5 (September 2002).

¹⁰ Ingrid Vaicius and Adam Isacson, *The "War on Drugs" Meets the "War on Terror". The United States' Military Involvement in Colombia Climbs to the Next Level*.

¹¹ Nuñez, 43

¹² Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, *Draft Declaration on Security in the Americas*, approved at its regular session (22 October 2003).

¹³ Keith Suter, *Global Order and Global Disorder: Globalization and the Nation-State*. (Praeger Publishers, Edit 2003), 20.

¹⁴ Judith A. Gentleman, *The Regional Security Crisis in the Andes: Patterns of State Response*. (Strategic Studies Institute, July 2001), 2.

¹⁵ Gabriel Marcella, *The United States and Colombia: The journey from Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity*. (Strategic Studies Institute, May 2003), 3

¹⁶ Ibid., 7

¹⁷ Ambassador Richard Haass, *Sovereignty: Existing Rights, Evolving Responsibilities*, remarks to the School of Foreign Service and the Mortara Center for International Studies (Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 14 January 2003).

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Humberto Marquez, *Latin America: U.S. continues to Ignore Turmoil in the Andes* (Global Information Network. New York, 6 November 2003) 1.

²⁰ Gral (r) Oswaldo Jarrín, "Border Not Military Cooperation," 9 December 2003; available from <<http://www.eluniverso.com>>; Internet; accessed 18 December 2003.

²¹ Vaicius and Isacson, 10

²² Gral (r) Jarrín

²³ Joseph. S. Tulchin, Francisco Rojas Aravena, and Ralph H. Espach, *Strategic Balance and Confidence Building Measures in the Americas*. (The Woodrow Wilson Center Press Washington D.C. 1998), 16.

²⁴ Owen-Vandersluis, 12

²⁵ Owen-Vandersluis, 15

²⁶ Ambassador Allan Wagner Tizón, *Globalization Through Integration*, in the official swearing-in ceremony of the Andean Community. (Lima, 15 January 2004)

²⁷ Gentleman, 1

²⁸ Bernard Aronson, "Supporting the Peace Process, CNA/NDU Workshop, Colombia: Strategic End State, Goals and Means," Conference (Alexandria, VA.6 October 2000)

²⁹ Gentleman, 1

³⁰ Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD), *Hacia el Objetivo del Milenio de Reducir la Pobreza en América Latina y el Caribe*. (Naciones Unidas, February 2003).

³¹ Marc Grossman, *Assistance to Colombia and the Andean Region*. Testimony of the Secretary for Political Affairs. (Washington, DC. 10 April 2002).

³² Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. "Report-2003: International Narcotics Control Strategy," March 2004; a vailable from <<http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/vol1/html/29829pf.htm>>; Internet; accessed 16 January 2003.

³³ Owen-Vandersluis, 23

³⁴ Marquez, 1

³⁵ Ecuadorian Foreign Ministry, *Agreement Between Ecuador and United States Governments to Accede and Use Manta Air Force Military Base of Ecuador to Execute Flights to Support Narcotrafficking Fight*. (Official Register No. 340, 17 November 1999)

³⁶ Luz E.Nagle, *Plan Colombia: Reality of the Crisis and Implications for Hemispheric Security* (Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, December 2002)

³⁷ Marcelo Larrea, *La Base de Manta: un enclave de los EEUU en el Ecuador*, 2 de agosto de 2002; available from <<http://www.ilacta.org/notic/020802a.htm>>; Internet; acceded 23 February 2004.

³⁸ Carl Von Clausewitz, "*On War*" *The effect of the political Aim on the Military Objective*. (Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton University Press, 1989)

³⁹ Alexander Aleinikoff T., *Semblances of Sovereignty: The Constitution, the State, and American Citizenship*. (Harvard University Press 2002)

⁴⁰ Gentleman, 2

⁴¹ Owen-Vandersluis, 19

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aleinikoff, T. Alexander. *Semblances of Sovereignty: The Constitution, the State, and American Citizenship*. Harvard University Press, 2002.
- Aronson, Bernard. *Supporting the Peace Process, CNA/NDU Workshop Colombia: Strategic End State, Goals and Means*, Conference. Alexandria, VA., 6 October 2000.
- Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, *Report-2003: International Narcotics Control Strategy*, March 2004. Available from <<http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/vol1/html/29829pf.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 16 January 2003.
- Christman, Daniel W., Heimann, John G., and Sweing, Julia E. *Andes 2020: A New Strategy for the Challenges of Colombia and the Region*. Council on Foreign Relations. 2004.
- Clausewitz, Carl Von. *On War: The effect of the political Aim on the Military Objective*. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton University Press, 1989.
- Economic Commission of Latin America and Caribbean (ECLAC), *Economic Indicators of Latin America and the Caribbean 2003: Division. Table D.1: Latin America (17 countries): Poverty and indigence levels, 1990-2000*. The data to 1999 shows Bolivia 60.6%, Colombia 54.9%, Ecuador 63.6% (urban area only there is not data of rural areas), Perú 48.6%, and Venezuela 49.4. It gives an average of 55.42% that is bigger than 43.8 Latin American average.
- Ecuadorian Foreign Ministry, *Agreement Between Ecuador and United States Governments to Accede and Use Manta Air Force Military Base of Ecuador to Execute Flights to Support Narcotrafficking Fight*. Official Register No. 340. 17 November 1999.
- Gentleman, Judith A. *The Regional Security Crisis in the Andes: Patterns of State Response*. Strategic Studies Institute, July 2001.
- Grossman, Marc. *Assistance to Colombia and the Andean Region*. Testimony of the Secretary for Political Affairs. Washington, DC. 10 April 2002.
- Haass, Richard. *Sovereignty: Existing Rights, Evolving Responsibilities*, remarks to the School of Foreign Service and the Mortara Center for International Studies. Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 14 January 2003.
- Hakim, Peter. *U.S.-Latin America relations post-9/11* in *Great Decisions* 2004. Editors of the Foreign Policy Association, 2004: 75-86
- Jarrín, Oswaldo. *Border Not Military Cooperation*, 9 December 2003. Available from <<http://www.eluniverso.com>>. Internet. Accessed 18 December 2003.
- Larrea, Marcelo. *La Base de Manta: un enclave de los EEUU en el Ecuador*, 2 de agosto de 2002. Available from <<http://www.llaeta.org/notic/020802a.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 23 February 2004.

- Marcella, Gabriel. *The United States and Colombia: The journey from Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity*. Strategic Studies Institute, May 2003.
- Marquez, Humberto. *Latin America: U.S. continues to Ignore Turmoil in the Andes*. Global Information Network. New York, 6 November 2003.
- Nagle, Luz E. *Plan Colombia: Reality of the Crisis and Implications for Hemispheric Security*. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, December 2002.
- Núñez, Joseph R. *Luchando en Contra de la Trinidad Obesiana en Colombia: Una Estrategia Para la Paz*. Aerospace Power Journal. Tercer Trimestre 2001.
- Núñez, Joseph. *Una Arquitectura para la Seguridad del Siglo XXI par alas Américas: Cooperación Multilateral, Paz y Poder Flexible*. Argentina Global No. 14 Spetember-October 2003.
- Owen-Vandersluis, Sarah. *The State and Identity Construction in International Relations*, in *The State of International Relations*, ed. Martin Shaw. London, Macmillan 2000, 18. Available from <<http://www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/ir/>>. Internet. Accessed 12 December 2003.
- Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, *Draft Declaration on Security in the Americas*, approved at its regular session. 22 October 2003.
- Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD), *Hacia el Objetivo del Milenio de Reducir la Pobreza en América Latina y el Caribe*. Naciones Unidas, February 2003.
- Serafino, Nina M., and Storrs, K. Larry. *Andean regional Initiative (ARI) FY2002 Supplemental and FY2003 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors* in *Colombia Current Issues and Historical Background* ed. Nina M. Serafino. Nova Science Publishers, Inc. 2003, 99-135.
- Simmons, Paul E. *U.S. Narcotics Control Initiatives in Colombia, Testimony Presented Before the Senate Drug Caucus*, 3 June 2003. Available from <<http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/rm/21203.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 28 November 2003.
- Spencer, David. *Colombia's Paramilitares: Criminals or Political Force?* Strategies Studies Institute, 2001.
- Suter, Keith. *Global Order and Global Disorder: Globalization and the Nation-State*. Praeger Publishers, Edit 2003.
- The White House, *Andean Regional Initiative*, Under President Bush's leadership, \$782 million in assistance has been approved for the Andean region in fiscal year 2002. The Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) advances the President's goal of strengthening democracy, regional stability, and economic development throughout the hemisphere. Washington, DC. 23 March 2002. Available from <<http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/8980.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 21 November 2003.
- Tulchin, Joseph. S, Rojas Aravena, Francisco, and Espach, Ralph H. *Strategic Balance and Confidence Building Measures in the Americas*. The Woodrow Wilson Center Press Washington D.C. 1998.

U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Policy Toward the Andean Region*. Available from
<<http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rtp/2985.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 5 December 2003.

U.S. National Security Strategy, Art. III. 5. September 2002.

Vaicius, Ingrid and Isacson, Adam. *The "War on Drugs" Meets the "War on Terror". The United States' Military Involvement in Colombia Climbs to the Next Level*.

Varas, Augusto. *Post Cold War Security Interests and Perceptions of Threat in the Western Hemisphere*. in *Security, Democracy, and Development in U.S.-Latin American Relations*, ed. Lars Schoultz, William C. Smith, and Augusto Varas. North-South Center 1994.

Wagner Tizón, Allan. *Globalization Through Integration, in the Official Swearing-in Ceremony of the Andean Community*. Lima, 15 January 2004.

